The Wrong Place to Be Chronically Ill

NY Times: The Wrong Place to Be Chronically Ill

Chronically ill Americans suffer far worse care than their counterparts in seven other industrial nations, according to a new study by the Commonwealth Fund, a New York-based foundation that has pioneered in international comparisons. It is the latest telling evidence that the dysfunctional American health care system badly needs reform.

The results of the study, published by the respected journal Health Affairs, belie the notion held by many American politicians that health care in this country is the best in the world. That may be true at a handful of pre-eminent medical centers, but it is hardly true for the care provided to a huge portion of the population.

From the report:

Synopsis
A 2008 survey of chronically ill adults in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States found major differences in health care access, safety, and efficiency, with U.S. patients at particularly high risk of forgoing care because of costs and experiencing errors or inefficient, poorly organized care.

Key Findings

  • More than half (54%) of U.S. patients did not get recommended care, fill prescriptions, or see a doctor when sick because of costs, versus 7 percent to 36 percent in the other countries.
  • About one-third of U.S. patients—the highest proportion in the survey—experienced medical errors, including delays in learning about abnormal lab test results.
  • Similarly, one-third of U.S. patients encountered poorly coordinated care, including medical records not available during an appointment or duplicated tests.
  • The U.S. stands out for patient costs, with 41 percent reporting they spent more than $1,000 on out-of-pocket costs in the past year. U.K. and Dutch patients were most protected against such costs.
  • Only one-quarter (26%) of U.S. and Canadian patients reported same-day access to doctors when sick, and one-fourth or more reported long waits. About half or more of Dutch (60%), New Zealand, (54%), and U.K. (48%) patients were able to get same-day appointments.
  • A majority of respondents across the eight countries saw room for improvement. Chronically ill adults in the U.S. were the most negative; one-third said the health care system needs a complete overhaul.
  • In the past two years, 59 percent of U.S. patients visited an emergency room (ER); only Canada had a higher rate (64%). In both countries, one of five patients said they went to the ER for a condition that could have been treated by a regular doctor if one had been available.

How to run a con

Paul Zak, Psychology Today Blogs: How to Run a Con.

The key to a con is not that you trust the conman, but that he shows he trusts you. Conmen ply their trade by appearing fragile or needing help, by seeming vulnerable. Because of THOMAS [The Human Oxytocin Mediated Attachment System], the human brain makes us feel good when we help others—this is the basis for attachment to family and friends and cooperation with strangers. “I need your help” is a potent stimulus for action.

via Bruce Schneier

“To put it succinctly, we win.”

Congratulations to Sam Wang and the Princeton Election Consortium.

The Electoral College
Outcome: Obama 365 EV, McCain 173. The map (NE 2 not shown):

65286379-CCA4-4C1A-8ADC-0D8687A47A3F.jpg

FiveThirtyEight: 348.5 EV. Error: 18.5 EV.
Electoral-vote.com: 353 EV. Error: 12 EV.
The last-day Median EV Estimator for Obama: 352 EV. Error: 13 EV.
Our prediction: Obama 364 EV, McCain 174. Error:1 EV.
Closest: Princeton Election Consortium.

Individual state wins
FiveThirtyEight: 50 out of 51 correct, Indiana missed.
Electoral-vote.com averages: 49 correct, 1 incorrect (Missouri), 1 tie (Indiana).
Our prediction: 50 correct, Indiana missed.
Closest: Tie between the Princeton Election Consortium and FiveThirtyEight.

Stephen Cohen on Russia

I have mixed feelings about Fareed Zakaria’s GPS (Sundays, CNN), but he does come up with interesting guests. New to me is Stephen Cohen, professor of Russian studies and history at NYU, and a frequent guest of Charlie Rose (whom I don’t get around to watching, I guess). Cohen was one of Zakaria’s guests yesterday, and his views on Russian external politics were clear and convincing. Of course, you might want to read that as “confirming my own prejudices”, but see if he doesn’t make just as much sense to you.

CNN offers the interview in two parts: one and two. If they get around to posting a transcript, I’ll extract some of it here, but the video is worth your time regardless.

The subjects include Georgia and the tiff over US anti-missileinstallations on Russia’s border. Go watch.

Politicians or political philosophers?

One of my favorite Dean Baker themes.

Politicians as Political Philosophers: Differences at the G-20

The NYT reported today on the political philosophy of that renowned political philosopher, George W. Bush, and how it prevented it from reaching agreement on many issues with the other leaders at the G-20 summit. According to the NYT article “it was clear that bridging ideological gaps among nations afflicted with different versions of the economic contagion would provide the new president and other world leaders with a daunting challenge.”

Maybe the problem is ideology but there is an alternative explanation. The financial sector is an extremely powerful interest group in the United States. It is relatively less powerful in countries like France and Germany, where the financial industry is a smaller share of the economy and other interest groups, like unions play a more important role.

Suppose the President Bush and other U.S. politicians feel the need to respond to the demand of a key interest group that plays an important role in their election. Suppose that the leaders of other countries instead feel the need to respond to the demands of others economic actors who have been hurt by the financial sector?

I don’t know if my description of the motivations of President Bush and other leaders is correct, but the NYT certainly does not know that it is wrong. It is worth noting that the people at the G-20 meeting all got there because of their success in politics, not political philosophy. It would be best if reporters refrained from imputing motives that they cannot know. News reporting should just tell us what the politicians said and did and not speculate about their thoughts.

—Dean Baker

Bailing out Detroit

Matthew Yglesias looks at the argument for a Big Three bailout and puts his finger on the problem.

Matthew Yglesias: Bailing Out in the Real World

I feel like some of the commentary on the prospect of an auto industry bailout is starting to remind me of some of the stuff I fell for before we invaded Iraq. The kind of thing where someone yes, “yes this sounds like a bad idea, but if we do it like this and like that and like this then it’ll all be okay, therefore we should do it.” Which is fine. But we also need to ask ourselves, if we accept the proposition of Detroit’s management, the UAW, and Michigan politicians that what’s good for General Motors is good for America, how likely is any of this stuff to happen.

TNR‘s Jonathan Cohn, for example, makes the most persuasive case for a Detroit bailout. Per Krugman’s summary:

If the economy as a whole were in reasonably good shape and the credit markets were functioning, Chapter 11 would be the way to go. Under current circumstances, however, a default by GM would probably mean loss of ability to pay suppliers, which would mean liquidation — and that, in turn, would mean wiping out probably well over a million jobs at the worst possible moment.

In essence, given the credit crunch Chapter 11 bankruptcy won’t work so the only alternative to bailout is liquidation, but liquidation is unacceptable given the macroeconomic situation, so we need to keep GM on life support as a jobs program.

But then read Jon’s colleague Clay Risen also in TNR:

There’s little I could say in addition to Jonathan’s wonderful article laying out the case for a brokered bailout for Detroit. […] But any bailout must be predicated on a planned shrinkage of the three companies. Suppliers need to be transitioned to other firms or industries, employment needs to be gradually reduced, and production facilities need to be shuttered. There should probably be a forced consolidation, too, with GM taking over Chrysler—a move that was already in the works before the credit crunch made it impossible to complete without government assistance.

Now there’s no metaphysical issue or law of nature preventing the government from first keeping these firms on life support as a jobs program, and then when the economy starts recovering beginning to shrink the workforce and drop suppliers. But in the real world, that’s very hard to imagine. If you think it’s politically difficult for politicians to stand aside and do nothing as a situation that threatens to cost a lot of people their jobs develops, just wait ’till you try to tell the White House political office that you want the president to order a round of massive layoffs in key midwestern swing states.

Similarly with all this environmental stuff. GM, Ford, and Chrysler may not be very good at turning a profit by selling cars and trucks but they’ve got a lot of political clout. Perhaps enough to get tens of billions of dollars of taxpayer money. Whatever conditions they agree to, they’ll probably be able to fight off.

I hope I’m wrong about this. But I’m pessimistic. The mere fact that it would be desirable to do something to keep everyone who depends on the car industry for a living that simultaneously restores the domestic car firms’ economic viability and serves environmental policy goals doesn’t make it possible. Generally the reason we try not to have the government running businesses is that promoting public goals and maximizing profits require you to do different things. We normally try to advance policy goals by establishing a framework of taxes and regulations so that firms pursuing their interests will be compatible with the public interest. But if GM is going to be a welfare agency, it’s hard to also expect it to be a viable company that will rapidly get off the federal teat.

Brother, can you spare a dime?

NYC 1929


Rob Kapilow talks about the Harburg/Gorney 1932 classic on NPR. It sounds alarmingly up to date, adjusted for inflation.

The article has links to several renditions of the song, of which Harburg’s is my favorite (though Daniel Schorr’s version, at the end of the audio version, is quite fine). YouTube has a perfectly awful version by George Michael, and a rather interesting performance by Mandy Patinkin on the David Letterman set. The audience isn’t sure whether it’s not an extended joke, but Patinkin sells it pretty well.

Susan Stamberg has a blog post on the piece, where Roger Hurwitz adds in comments:

The interview, which Susan references, was with the late Studs Terkel and appears in his recently published P.S. (New Press, 2008). In it Harburg said about the song “it was trying to expound a social theory… that our whole system of capitalism and free enterprise is based a rather illogical and unscientific groundwork: that we each exploit each other, we each get as much out of the wealth of the world that our ruthlessness… gives us permission to enjoy. and most people who don’t have that kind of power are left penniless, even though they do most of the producing.”

Harburg went on to say that if Cole Porter had written the song, the singer would be the man asked for the dime and would have given a half-dollar.

Patricia Spaeth, commenting on the main article, rightly complains that Kapilow ignores the verse; let’s have the whole thing, shall we?

Brother, Can You Spare a Dime
lyrics by Yip Harburg, music by Jay Gorney (1931)

They used to tell me I was building a dream, and so I followed the mob,
When there was earth to plow, or guns to bear, I was always there right on the job.
They used to tell me I was building a dream, with peace and glory ahead,
Why should I be standing in line, just waiting for bread?

Once I built a railroad, I made it run, made it race against time.
Once I built a railroad; now it’s done. Brother, can you spare a dime?
Once I built a tower, up to the sun, brick, and rivet, and lime;
Once I built a tower, now it’s done. Brother, can you spare a dime?

Once in khaki suits, gee we looked swell,
Full of that Yankee Doodly Dum,
Half a million boots went slogging through Hell,
And I was the kid with the drum!

Say, don’t you remember, they called me Al; it was Al all the time.
Why don’t you remember, I’m your pal? Buddy, can you spare a dime?

Once in khaki suits, gee we looked swell,
Full of that Yankee Doodly Dum,
Half a million boots went slogging through Hell,
And I was the kid with the drum!

Say, don’t you remember, they called me Al; it was Al all the time.
Say, don’t you remember, I’m your pal? Buddy, can you spare a dime?

Should the Fed have popped the housing bubble?

The FRBSF’s Kevin Lansing wonders, and concludes with a rather noncommittal “further research is needed”; “unsatisfying”, says Mark Thoma. It seems to me that Lansing’s actual views are clear enough, a little earlier in the Letter.

Monetary Policy and Asset Prices, by Kevin Lansing, FRBSF Economic Letter


Beyond the setting of short-term nominal interest rates, a broader view of monetary policy includes regulatory oversight of financial institutions. Throughout history, asset price bubbles have typically coincided with outbreaks of fraud and scandal, followed by calls for more regulation once the bubble has burst (see Gerding 2006). Recent bubble episodes are no different. If a goal of financial regulation is to prevent fraud, and as history attests, asset price bubbles are typically associated with fraud, then one could argue that financial regulators at central banks should strive to prevent bubbles.

According to Mishkin (2008), financial regulators at central banks may have a greater likelihood of identifying a credit-fueled bubble in real time because “they might have information that lenders have weakened their underwriting standards and that credit extension is rising at abnormally high rates.” He argues that “financial developments might then lead policymakers to consider implementing policies to…help reduce the magnitude of the bubble.” During the recent housing bubble, underwriting standards were weakened and credit extension did rise at abnormally high rates, resulting in rapid growth of subprime mortgage lending. In the aftermath of the burst housing bubble, financial regulators are now taking steps to strengthen the integrity of underwriting, appraisal, and credit-rating procedures.

via Mark Thoma

Google tracks flu trends

google.org flu trends

We’ve found that certain search terms are good indicators of flu activity. Google Flu Trends uses aggregated Google search data to estimate flu activity in your state up to two weeks faster than traditional flu surveillance systems.

Each week, millions of users around the world search for online health information. As you might expect, there are more flu-related searches during flu season, more allergy-related searches during allergy season, and more sunburn-related searches during the summer. You can explore all of these phenomena using Google Trends. But can search query trends provide an accurate, reliable model of real-world phenomena?

We have found a close relationship between how many people search for flu-related topics and how many people actually have flu symptoms. Of course, not every person who searches for “flu” is actually sick, but a pattern emerges when all the flu-related search queries from each state and region are added together. We compared our query counts with data from a surveillance system managed by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and discovered that some search queries tend to be popular exactly when flu season is happening. By counting how often we see these search queries, we can estimate how much flu is circulating in various regions of the United States.

During the 2007-2008 flu season, an early version of Google Flu Trends was used to share results each week with the Epidemiology and Prevention Branch of the Influenza Division at CDC. Across each of the nine surveillance regions of the United States, we were able to accurately estimate current flu levels one to two weeks faster than published CDC reports.

19C53BCF-0C59-4DAD-B449-24DA01890366.jpg

This graph shows five years of query-based flu estimates for the Mid-Atlantic region of the United States, compared against influenza surveillance data provided by CDC’s U.S. Influenza Sentinel Provider Surveillance Network. As you can see, estimates based on Google search queries about flu are very closely matched to a flu activity indicator used by CDC. Of course, past performance is no guarantee of future results. Our system is still very experimental, so anything is possible, but we’re hoping to see similar correlations in the coming year.

CDC uses a variety of methods to track influenza across the United States each year. One method relies on a network of more than 1500 doctors who see 16 million patients each year. The doctors keep track of the percentage of their patients who have an influenza-like illness, also known as an “ILI percentage”. CDC and state health departments collect and aggregate this data each week, providing a good indicator of overall flu activity across the United States.

So why bother with estimates from aggregated search queries? It turns out that traditional flu surveillance systems take 1-2 weeks to collect and release surveillance data, but Google search queries can be automatically counted very quickly. By making our flu estimates available each day, Google Flu Trends may provide an early-warning system for outbreaks of influenza.

For epidemiologists, this is an exciting development, because early detection of a disease outbreak can reduce the number of people affected. If a new strain of influenza virus emerges under certain conditions, a pandemic could emerge and cause millions of deaths (as happened, for example, in 1918). Our up-to-date influenza estimates may enable public health officials and health professionals to better respond to seasonal epidemics and — though we hope never to find out — pandemics.

Tough love for GM

Tough something, anyway. Two good pieces from NPR Morning Edition making the case for Chapter 11. Go have a listen.

Bankruptcy Could Help Fix Automakers’ Problems

President-elect Barack Obama wants to give U.S. automakers federal funds. Critics say funding without conditions would be like pouring gas into a broken-down clunker. Paul Ingrassia, a former Detroit bureau chief for The Wall Street Journal, says bankrupty might be a better option. He tells Ari Shapiro that bankruptcy could open the door to badly needed changes.

Professor: GM Must Confront Financial Challenges

Advocates for the nation’s automakers are warning that the collapse of General Motors could set off a catastrophic chain reaction in the economy. Douglas Baird, a professor at the University of Chicago Law School, says in order to fix its financial problems, GM needs to confront its challenges head on. Baird tells Ari Shapiro that getting a bailout won’t solve the car companies’ problems.

Meanwhile, GM’s website offers me a great deal ($54,608.39) on a Hummer. Feed ’em to the sharks. And the Chevy Volt? Gimme a break. I like the underlying series-hybrid technology, but look, this is GM. Surely somebody else will come and do it right.

E5EB7283-D5CE-4FF0-8422-D1CE248A14CD.jpg

No wonder GM expects to sell only 10,000 (at $40K a pop, it seems) … in 2010.

Not policies that we can believe in

Dean Baker, posting at TPMCafe.

The High Priests of the Bubble Economy

Those following the meeting of Barack Obama’s economic advisory committee could not have been very reassured by the presence of Robert Rubin and Larry Summers, both former Treasury secretaries in the Clinton administration. Along with former Federal Reserve Board chairman Alan Greenspan, Rubin and Summers compose the high priesthood of the bubble economy. Their policy of one-sided financial deregulation is responsible for the current economic catastrophe.

It is important to separate Clinton-era mythology from the real economic record. In the mythology, Clinton’s decision to raise taxes and cut spending led to an investment boom. This boom led to a surge in productivity growth. Soaring productivity growth led to the low unemployment of the late 1990s and wage gains for workers at all points along the wage distribution.

Rather than handing George Bush a booming economy, Clinton handed over an economy that was propelled by an unsustainable stock bubble and distorted by a hugely over-valued dollar.

While the Bush administration must take responsibility for the current crisis (they have been in power the last eight years), the stage was set during the Clinton years. The Clinton team set the economy on the path of one-sided financial deregulation and bubble driven growth that brought us where we are today. (The deregulation was one-sided, because they did not take away the “too big to fail” security blanket of the Wall Street big boys.)

For this reason, it was very discouraging to see top Clinton administration officials standing centre stage at Obama’s meeting on the economy. This is not change, and certainly not policies that we can believe in.

Even Yet More on Credit Default Swaps

What Kevin Drum says. Especially that last bit.

Even Yet More on Credit Default Swaps

Admit it: you can’t get enough of credit default swaps, can you? Well, after yesterday’s post on the subject, a bunch of people insisted that I needed to read Michael Lewis’s latest piece in Portfolio right away, and since I’m a big Michael Lewis fan I got right on it. As usual, it’s great, so do yourself a favor and drink in the whole thing sometime soon.

For now, though, let’s focus just on the CDS part of Lewis’s piece. Here’s the backstory: a hedge fund manager named Steve Eisman, who believed the entire subprime house of cards was due to implode, wanted a way to bet against the market. So he shorted the stocks of subprime originators like New Century and Indy Mac and then looked around for even more targeted ways to make money on the coming collapse. The Holy Grail came from Greg Lippman, a mortgage-bond trader at Deutsche Bank:

The smart trade, Lippman argued, was to sell short not New Century’’s stock but its bonds that were backed by the subprime loans it had made. Eisman hadn’’t known this was even possible — because until recently, it hadn’’t been. But Lippman, along with traders at other Wall Street investment banks, had created a way to short the subprime bond market with precision… Instead of shorting the actual BBB bond, you could now enter into an agreement for a credit-default swap with Deutsche Bank or Goldman Sachs. It cost money to make this side bet, but nothing like what it cost to short the stocks, and the upside was far greater.

But why was a bond trader recommending that Eisman short bonds in his own market? The answer came after Eisman had a conversation at an industry dinner:

His dinner companion in Las Vegas ran a fund of about $15 billion and managed C.D.O.’s backed by the BBB tranche of a mortgage bond, or as Eisman puts it, “the equivalent of three levels of dog shit lower than the original bonds… [But] not only did he not mind that Eisman took a dim view of his C.D.O.’s; he saw it as a basis for friendship. “Then he said something that blew my mind,” Eisman tells me. “He says, ‘I love guys like you who short my market. Without you, I don’’t have anything to buy.’”

That’’s when Eisman finally got it. Here he’d been making these side bets with Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank on the fate of the BBB tranche without fully understanding why those firms were so eager to make the bets. Now he saw. There weren’’t enough Americans with shitty credit taking out loans to satisfy investors’’ appetite for the end product. The firms used Eisman’’s bet to synthesize more of them…The only assets backing the bonds were the side bets Eisman and others made with firms like Goldman Sachs. Eisman, in effect, was paying to Goldman the interest on a subprime mortgage. In fact, there was no mortgage at all. “They weren’t satisfied getting lots of unqualified borrowers to borrow money to buy a house they couldn’t afford,” Eisman says. “They were creating them out of whole cloth. One hundred times over! That’s why the losses are so much greater than the loans. But that’s when I realized they needed us to keep the machine running. I was like, This is allowed?”

I still won’t pretend that I fully understand this. In fact, every time I read a story like this, it seems to get right up to the good stuff — “They were creating them out of whole cloth. One hundred times over!” — and then suddenly moves on. But I want more! I want an entire 10,000 word piece on how the combination of CDOs and CDS allowed Wall Street to magnify their underlying subprime losses so catastrophically. Instead, I just get a teaser and then the story meanders off in a more colorful direction.

Better than nothing, I suppose. And you should read Lewis’s entire piece regardless. But I still wish someone could explain in layman’s terms what this all means.

Hopeful signs on health care

Thus Paul Krugman.

Hopeful signs on health care

This is very big news. One of the key questions about the new Democratic majority was whether Congress would try to play it safe, backing down on big ideas about reform, especially on health care. You can view the whole chorus about how we’re still a “center-right nation” as an attempt by the usual suspects to scare Democrats into scaling back their ambitions.

But now Max Baucus — Max Baucus! — is leading the charge on a health care plan that, at least at first read, is more like Hillary Clinton’s than Barack Obama’s; that is, it looks like an attempt at full universality. (The word I hear, by the way, is that Obama’s opposition to mandates was tactical politics, not conviction — so he may well be prepared to do the right thing now that the election is won.)

So this looks very good for the reformers. There’s now a reasonable chance that universal health care will be enacted next year!

In the Guardian, Dean Baker argues that universal health care would do double duty as an economic stimulus package.

How Obama can save the US economy

Few presidents will come into office having generated the sort of expectations Barack Obama created over the course of his campaign. The country’s economic crisis poses substantial dangers but it also presents enormous opportunities. If President Obama is prepared to seize these opportunities, he will establish himself as one of the countries truly great presidents, alongside Lincoln and Roosevelt.

Specifically, Obama can take advantage of the current economic crisis to announce plans to jump-start national health insurance. Extending health insurance can be an effective stimulus that will provide an immediate boost to the economy. More importantly, it will provide the same access to healthcare that people in other wealthy countries have long taken for granted.

Extending healthcare coverage in this way is effectively eating dessert before dinner, but this is exactly what we want to do to counter the recession. It is important that we spend money now to boost the economy. We will be getting double-value if this stimulus can be spent usefully toward meeting a longstanding goal, like providing national healthcare insurance, rather than just buying things at the mall.

That old Lie

DULCE ET DECORUM EST

Bent double, like old beggars under sacks,
Knock-kneed, coughing like hags, we cursed through sludge,
Till on the haunting flares we turned our backs
And towards our distant rest began to trudge.
Men marched asleep. Many had lost their boots
But limped on, blood-shod. All went lame; all blind;
Drunk with fatigue; deaf even to the hoots
Of tired, outstripped Five-Nines that dropped behind.

Gas! Gas! Quick, boys! — An ecstasy of fumbling,
Fitting the clumsy helmets just in time;
But someone still was yelling out and stumbling,
And flound’ring like a man in fire or lime…
Dim, through the misty panes and thick green light,
As under a green sea, I saw him drowning.
In all my dreams, before my helpless sight,
He plunges at me, guttering, choking, drowning.

If in some smothering dreams you too could pace
Behind the wagon that we flung him in,
And watch the white eyes writhing in his face,
His hanging face, like a devil’s sick of sin;
If you could hear, at every jolt, the blood
Come gargling from the froth-corrupted lungs,
Obscene as cancer, bitter as the cud
Of vile, incurable sores on innocent tongues,
My friend, you would not tell with such high zest
To children ardent for some desperate glory,
The old Lie; Dulce et Decorum est
Pro patria mori.

Wilfred Owen, 1917

FDR, the Great Depression, and Obama

Paul Krugman, on economic lessons to be learned from the Great Depression.

Franklin Delano Obama?

Suddenly, everything old is New Deal again. Reagan is out; F.D.R. is in. Still, how much guidance does the Roosevelt era really offer for today’s world?

The answer is, a lot. But Barack Obama should learn from F.D.R.’s failures as well as from his achievements: the truth is that the New Deal wasn’t as successful in the short run as it was in the long run. And the reason for F.D.R.’s limited short-run success, which almost undid his whole program, was the fact that his economic policies were too cautious.

Now, there’s a whole intellectual industry, mainly operating out of right-wing think tanks, devoted to propagating the idea that F.D.R. actually made the Depression worse. So it’s important to know that most of what you hear along those lines is based on deliberate misrepresentation of the facts. The New Deal brought real relief to most Americans.

That said, F.D.R. did not, in fact, manage to engineer a full economic recovery during his first two terms. This failure is often cited as evidence against Keynesian economics, which says that increased public spending can get a stalled economy moving. But the definitive study of fiscal policy in the ’30s, by the M.I.T. economist E. Cary Brown, reached a very different conclusion: fiscal stimulus was unsuccessful “not because it does not work, but because it was not tried.”

What saved the economy, and the New Deal, was the enormous public works project known as World War II, which finally provided a fiscal stimulus adequate to the economy’s needs.

The economic lesson is the importance of doing enough. F.D.R. thought he was being prudent by reining in his spending plans; in reality, he was taking big risks with the economy and with his legacy. My advice to the Obama people is to figure out how much help they think the economy needs, then add 50 percent. It’s much better, in a depressed economy, to err on the side of too much stimulus than on the side of too little.

Study shows how spammers cash in

Via the BBC:

Study shows how spammers cash in

Spammers are turning a profit despite only getting one response for every 12.5m e-mails they send, finds a study.

By hijacking a working spam network, US researchers have uncovered some of the economics of being a junk mailer.

The analysis suggests that such a tiny response rate means a big spam operation can turn over millions of pounds in profit every year.

It also suggests that spammers may be susceptible to attacks that make it more costly to send junk mail.

DST is an energy hog

Stephen Dubner, in the NY Times Freakonomics column, reports on a study that suggests that Daylight Saving Time increases electricity demand by about 1%, based on a “natural experiment” in Indiana.

We spent the better part of the 1990s in Arizona, which does not observe DST, and can attest to the desirability of doing away with the time change; the energy expended in setting clocks alone would make abandoning it worthwhile.

Here’s the abstract.

Does Daylight Saving Time Save Energy? Evidence From a Natural Experiment in Indiana

The history of Daylight Saving Time (DST) has been long and controversial. Throughout its implementation during World Wars I and II, the oil embargo of the 1970s, consistent practice today, and recent extensions, the primary rationale for DST has always been to promote energy conservation. Nevertheless, there is surprisingly little evidence that DST actually saves energy. This paper takes advantage of a natural experiment in the state of Indiana to provide the first empirical estimates of DST effects on electricity consumption in the United States since the mid-1970s. Focusing on residential electricity demand, we conduct the first-ever study that uses micro-data on households to estimate an overall DST effect. The dataset consists of more than 7 million observations on monthly billing data for the vast majority of households in southern Indiana for three years. Our main finding is that—contrary to the policy’s intent—DST increases residential electricity demand. Estimates of the overall increase are approximately 1 percent, but we find that the effect is not constant throughout the DST period. DST causes the greatest increase in electricity consumption in the fall, when estimates range between 2 and 4 percent. These findings are consistent with simulation results that point to a tradeoff between reducing demand for lighting and increasing demand for heating and cooling. We estimate a cost of increased electricity bills to Indiana households of $9 million per year. We also estimate social costs of increased pollution emissions that range from $1.7 to $5.5 million per year. Finally, we argue that the effect is likely to be even stronger in other regions of the United States.

Sunday godblogging: Andrew Brown and William James

I first came across Andrew Brown through his fine 1999 book The Darwin Wars (jacket blurb from Daniel Dennett: ‘I wouldn’t admit it if Andrew Brown were my friend. What a sleazy bit of trash journalism’).

Much of Brown’s beat has been coverage of religion (in the UK), and he approaches the subject with considerable sympathy. The “wars” in the Darwin book are not centrally religious (well, not in the God sense), since the subject is primarily internecine intellectual battles, not evolution vs creationism. But buried in a footnote was a signal to me that Brown and I shared a particular point of view: “The clearest and most delightful example of how to think about religious belief is still William James’s The Varieties of Religion Experience” (p171 in the 1999 UK edition). Indeed.

Like Brown, I came to recognize the virtues of Varieties rather late. My undergraduate focus was on the later Wittgenstein, and while of course I encountered James, he didn’t really click with me until I reread Varieties (and subsequently a great deal more of James) decades later.

[A digression: there seems to me to be an affinity between the later James and the later Wittgenstein, though I’d be hard-pressed to define exactly what I mean by that. Russell Goodman’s little book Wittgenstein and William James is interesting, but to my mind too much focused on the less interesting early work of both philosophers.]

But I should let Brown speak for himself; you’ll find more of his on his personal blog, Helmintholog (he wrote a book on nematode research a while back).

(I do beg Andrew Brown and the Guardian to forgive me for my rather extensive, nay, wholesale, quoting of this piece.)

How I lost my unfaith

When I started to write about religion I had no doubt that the future would be more secular and no less rational than the past I had grown up in. I was astonished to discover that there were still educated people who believed that St Paul had anything of interest to say about anything. It seemed obvious that they would fade away even within the church as they had faded outside. I thought that people who had learned about science could not take seriously the possibility of a world which was, as Carl Sagan put it, “demon-haunted”. I made my 13-year-old son read The Selfish Gene, and asked Richard Dawkins to sign his copy.

I suppose it’s 15 years since any of those hopes seemed plausible to me. Today, there are more people calling themselves atheists in the US than ever before, but superstition – as distinct from organised religion – is also a huge and growing business. Astrologers are the highest paid writers on Fleet Street. Creationism is just as absurd as it ever was, but much better funded. Globally, there have never been more believers alive than there are today, just as there have never been more slaves than in today’s world.

So it’s obvious that my earlier faith in the progress of reason was misplaced. The future may very well be more secular, but it won’t be any more rational without a tremendous moral effort — and any collective moral effort will have much of the characteristics of a religion, including a tendency to objectify and later to personify the abstractions by which we orient ourselves in world.

I still don’t for a moment believe in petitionary prayer or an intervening God; as I have said earlier; I don’t even think that the existence of God is a very interesting question. What has changed is what I believe about belief.

The trigger was two-fold. One was reading William James with real attention, but what had provoked that was rereading The Selfish Gene after a prolonged absence while I had been writing about religion. What that book said about biology seemed to me luminous and profound. What it said (in passing) about Christianity was palpable nonsense. I don’t mean here the opinion of God. I mean the description of faith, and of the psychology of belief.

No matter how often is it repeated that religious faith is uniquely and by definition a matter of assent to propositions for which there is no evidence, this simply won’t do as a description. Quite probably some or all forms of religion do involve assent to untrue propositions but so does any programme to change the world. So, for that matter, does belief in memes, or supposing that we, uniquely as a species, can overcome the tyranny of our selfish genes.

The subtle melancholy of Williams James, drifting like a fog into the bright certainties of his Victorian audience and quietly rusting them with doubt, was – and remains – much more realistic. James, in his Varieties of Religious Experience addressed head-on the paradox apparent even 120 years ago, that some people need to have faith to live at all even while everything they know about science suggests it is misplaced or wrong.

This isn’t the only form of religious belief, or even the most important one. The temperament that finds James attractive is not all that widespread. But he does — like Marx — locate the wellsprings of belief in the human heart. Nor does he suppose, as Marx did, that we could transcend the present limitations of our hearts in a revolutionary spasm of enlightenment.

We are all such helpless failures in the last resort.

He wrote:

The sanest and best of us are of one clay with lunatics and prison inmates, and death finally runs the robustest of us down. And whenever we feel this, such a sense of the vanity and provisionality of our voluntary career comes over us that all our morality appears but as a plaster hiding a sore it can never cure, and all our well-doing as the hollowest substitute for that well being that our lives ought to be grounded in, but, alas! are not.

Now I submit that the only kind of atheist who does not feel like this sometimes is one who does not feel at all that they are one clay with the lunatics who believe; or else someone who, like Conrad in a letter of about the same period, feels confident enough in his own work not to care:

What makes mankind tragic is not that they are the victim of nature, it is that they are conscious of it. To be part of the animal kingdom under the conditions of this earth is very well – but as soon as you know of your slavery, the pain, the anger, the strife — the tragedy begins. We can’t return to nature since we can’t change our place in it. Our refuge is in stupidity, in drunkenness of all kinds, in lies, in beliefs, in murder, thieving, reforming — in negation, in contempt — each man according to the promptings of his particular devil. There is no morality, no knowledge, and no hope; there is only the consciousness of ourselves which drives us about a world that whether seen in a convex or a concave mirror, is always but a vain and fleeing appearance.

Both these grim visions are better and more cheerful than the religious prospect of eternal damnation. (I really do not think that anyone sane can contemplate steadily the Calvinist doctrine of eternal conscious torment.) But they are hardly cheerful ones, and they certainly don’t make one optimistic about a future of sunlit rationality.

Oddly enough, I think that James the psychologist was here more realistic about human nature than Conrad the novelist. Perhaps novelists can only make their points sidelong, by incarnation. But either way, when you carry the atheist programme to its conclusion, and naturalise religious belief, you are left with something which grows from the ineradicable desires of the human heart. Of course, a Buddhist might say it is our only hope to eradicate desire – but what is Buddhism but a religion itself?

I don’t doubt that it is possible to extinguish any particular theology and almost any religious community. But when they are gone, what stands in their place are different mythologies. William James was probably the father of the naturalistic study of religion: the psychology of religious experience is studiedly neutral as to the reality of whatever provoked these psychological experiences. But when the study of religion has been entirely naturalised, one of the things we can no longer do is to demonise believers. It may be that psychology tells us that we will continue to demonise our enemies whether or not we decently can: the trick has just proved too useful in the past. But in that case we will hardly have moved into a bright new world of rationality.